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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
ECONOMIC 
Perspective 
DEVOLUTION AND PUBLIC SPENDING: 
ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE 
by Arthur Midwinter, Department of 
Government, University of Strathclyde 
INTRODUCTION 
The financial arrangements for devolved 
government in Scotland have been regarded as 
problematic since the publication of the White 
Paper in 1997. Scotland's Parliament inherited the 
block and formula system for determining 
Scotland's share of annual changes in departmental 
expenditure from the Scottish Office, supplemented 
by a modest tax-varying power. These provisions 
have been criticised for creating a relationship with 
the UK government of fiscal dependency, with 
limited autonomy and accountability, and a 
potential for creating a constitutional conflict over 
spending. That said, it should be acknowledged 
that the Scottish arrangements are similar to those 
pertaining in the regional government systems in 
Europe, in which the main source of funding is a 
block grant, and tax powers are minimal. 
Within the UK Government, the key principle in 
the public finances is the allocation of resources on 
the basis of relative needs, with the objective of 
setting broadly similar standards of public service 
throughout the UK, irrespective of fiscal 
contributions to the Exchequer. Additional 
Scottish needs have been recognised both within 
resource formulae and in political allocations for 
most of the last century. This approach to 
governance has been termed territorial politics, 
whereby Scottish ministers and civil servants 
sought to argue the Scottish case for resources 
within the unitary state, usually with considerable 
success. 
There has been a growing differential between 
Scotland and the UK average since 1945, which 
rose to around 14 per cent above in the 1950s, and 
upwards to 26% above in 1969-70, before falling 
under the Heath Government. It remained around 
20% higher in the 1970s (1). These comparisons 
relate to what is termed 'identifiable public 
expenditure', which can be identified as having 
been incurred in a particular country. During this 
period the Scottish Office bargained over its 
individual programmes with the Treasury in the 
conventional way. The result was that significant 
increases in public expenditure were negotiated for 
Scotland in the context of an active regional policy. 
It was during this period also that the principle of 
treating the Scottish totals as a block, which can be 
adjusted at the margins, was established. This led 
one observer to conclude that: 
" the system of building up a total of Scottish 
expenditure by reference to Scottish expenditure by 
reference to Scottish needs in particular areas has 
produced higher per capita public expenditure in 
Scotland in almost every category of public 
expenditure." (2) 
McCrone regards this as a reflection of the 
"powerful advocacy of successive Secretaries of 
State when presenting Scotland's case". The 
success of this approach became transparent during 
the devolution debates of the 1970s, and led to 
greater political attention being paid to Scottish 
spending levels, partly by Labour MPs in Northern 
England concerned at the Scottish 'advantage', and 
partly by Conservative MPs hostile to devolution. 
That Scotland has higher expenditure needs than 
the UK as a whole has generally been accepted by 
both major parties, but the scale of those higher 
needs has not been determined with any precision. 
This is an issue we shall return to later. 
After 1978, British Governments used a formulaic 
approach to determining territorial expenditure, in 
which Scottish totals were calculated by 
apportioning its share of the increases/decreases 
bargained by English departments, in comparable 
spending programmes. The expenditure baseline 
was carried forward from the previous year, and the 
increase determined by Scotland's share of the 
British population, using a ratio of 85:10:5, for 
England, Scotland and Wales. This gave Scotland 
10/85 of any increase from England. One recent 
review regarded this system as offering three 
advantages for Scotland, in that it protected the 
existing advantages, avoided the need for detailed 
negotiations, and retained the power to reallocate 
resources. (3) 
Former Scottish Secretary, George Younger, 
argued that this mechanism is valuable to ministers, 
as Scottish needs and priorities are often different. 
Other commentators stress the marginal nature of 
this discretion, with priorities working out very 
similarly across territorial departments because of 
the integrative force of cabinet and party 
government. (4) 
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More recently, however, the arrangements have 
been criticised by a number of economists for 
creating a situation whereby there will be a gradual 
convergence of public expenditure per capita 
across the UK, and that this is inequitable given 
Scotland's higher expenditure needs, on grounds of 
poverty, poor health and sparsity. Such critics 
point to the implications of the mathematics 
underlying the Bamett formula causing very real 
problems for the devolved Parliament. 
The difficulty is that the credibility of the 
Parliament with the electorate relies on its ability to 
deliver effective public services. But the Barnett 
squeeze implies that even if these services are 
growing in real terms, they will not be growing as 
rapidly in Scotland as they will in England and 
Wales" (5). 
Predictions of such convergence have been made 
for over twenty years, but there is very little 
evidence of it occurring in practice, because of the 
capacity of politicians to take decisions which 
'bypass' the formula, and because of the offsetting 
effect of Scotland's relative population decline (6). 
However, the critics argue that the administrative 
reforms to the system instituted in 1992 tighten up 
the Treasury's controls over such factors, and 
predict that Barnett will bite much harder in future 
(7). 
My view is that this is an unduly mechanistic 
interpretation of a political process. I do not deny 
that the Barnett formula is an important element of 
the funding arrangements, but it is not the only 
element, and in a system of incremental budgeting, 
political acceptability is the key test in resource 
allocation. Formulae which do not deliver 
acceptable outcomes will be tweaked, 
supplemented or reformed if necessary to provide 
outcomes that politicians can live with. 
In this paper, my objective is to examine the 
empirical evidence of the impact of the formula on 
expenditure outcomes since 1992. There have 
been number of studies on the impact of the 
formula over the period 1979-92, which show 
Scotland continuing to receive expenditure 
allocations on a range from some 14% to 24% 
above the UK average. Moreover, such studies 
show no consistent trend, other than Scotland's 
spending differential remaining higher (8). The 
empirical analysis falls into two parts. Firstly, I 
examine expenditure outcomes using outturn data 
from 1992-1997. Secondly, I consider expenditure 
plans from 1997-2003. It is necessary, however, 
to put the study in context, by a systematic 
exposition of the development of the formula and 
the arguments of its critics. 
THE FORMULA AND ITS CRITICS 
The use of the formula for resource allocation to 
Scotland began in 1978, and is the mechanism by 
which changes in public expenditure in England are 
apportioned to Scotland and Wales (9). It has 
been argued that it was introduced as a transitional 
mechanism pending the development of a robust 
needs-based approach, but it has remained in 
operation since then, with only minor adjustments 
in 1992. (10) Its operation appears deceptively 
simple, in that the formula, "provided that, in 
settling new plans for public expenditure, Scotland 
and Wales should receive a share of the planned 
cash changes in provision for equivalent public 
services in England which is proportionate to their 
population. In other words, Scotland and Wales' 
share of changes in relevant expenditure are the 
same proportions as their populations represent of 
England's population. The formula applies only to 
changes in spending plans not to the underlying 
baselines which remain unaffected". (11) 
The effect of this system was to greatly reduce the 
need for annual budgetary negotiations between the 
Scottish Office and the Treasury, the system which 
applied between 1958 and 1978, and which 
continues to determine departmental totals in 
England. Twigger and Dyson observed three 
advantages of this approach to the Scottish Office: 
1. "the operation of the formula protects (to a 
large extent) the existing situation where 
spending per head is above the national 
average. 
2. There is no need for the department to argue 
the case for equal treatment on each occasion 
that a relevant programme in England receives 
increased funding. 
3. The Secretary of State retains the freedom to 
allocate the block between programmes" (12) 
The mechanics of this system were not wholly 
straightforward. Firstly, it only applied to the 
Scottish Block, which concerned around 96% of 
the Scottish budget. Non-block expenditure was 
allocated through the conventional incremental 
bidding model. Secondly, not all expenditure 
within services in the block is "comparable". 
"comparability is the extent to which services 
delivered by departments of the United Kingdom 
government correspond to services within the 
budgets of the devolved administrations. For each 
UK departmental programme, defined by 
Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) a 
comparability percentage is calculated by 
examining the component (sub-programme) within 
that programme. Each sub-programme is weighted 
by its spending in the base year to give an overall 
level comparability" (13) 
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Thirdly, there were expenditure functions within 
the Scottish Block which have no English 
counterpart, requiring negotiated allocations, as 
occurred at water privatisation (14). 
It is important, at this stage to clarify certain 
misconceptions about the block and formula 
arrangements. Firstly, the formula is not a needs 
assessment model per se, although population is a 
key determinant of expenditure, and the system 
delivers higher percentage increases to those with 
growing populations. However, the totals reflect 
the cumulative outcomes of Treasury/departmental 
bargaining over expenditure needs in the general 
sense. Therefore, in establishing a formulaic 
approach based on population, "The Treasury 
accepted that the current balance of spending 
between the UK and the territories identified in the 
review was sufficient to justify entrenching through 
introducing a population formula rather than some 
other kind" (15) 
In short, the settlement recognised that Scotland did 
have higher expenditure needs than the UK 
average, and whilst this could not be assessed with 
precision, the differentials were acceptable. 
Secondly, it should now be clear that the formula 
does not distribute resources throughout the UK, as 
the media often report. Rather it allocates funding 
to the devolved governments. Much of the 
criticism of imbalances of needs and resources 
comes from regions within England, where no 
comparable administrative structures exist 
Barnett is a formula which applies to the devolved 
governments, not English departments, whose 
allocations remain negotiated directly with the 
Treasury. 
Thirdly, Barnett does not determine the overall size 
of the block, but only the share of changes. 
Baseline expenditure is the dominant element of the 
new block allocation to Scotland. 
Fourthly, it is not a mechanism for delivering full 
convergence - i.e. equal spending per capita across 
the UK. Convergence is not government policy, 
and never has been. Convergence only occurs in 
certain condition such as expenditure growth within 
the block, population stability and the absence of 
offsetting decisions outwith the formula. The 
Treasury identified four factors, which continue to 
affect the expenditure relativities. These are: 
1. The rate of increase/decrease in cash in 
equivalent English spending programmes. 
2. Changes in population relativities which are 
not reflected in the underlying expenditure 
baselines 
3. Changes in relative public spending per head 
on programmes outwith the block 
4. Changes made in year to provision for the 
block allocations (16). 
As previous research has shown, all these factors 
have been important in offsetting any trend to 
convergence in Scottish budgets in the past 
Analysis of Scottish expenditure which 
concentrates wholly on the formulaic element 
invites misleading conclusions. In practice, there 
is considerable 'give and take' between Scottish 
officials and the Treasury. The underlying 
assumption that Scotland has higher needs remains. 
Scottish officials regard the approach as 
advantageous even if some modest degree of 
convergence were to occur. Former Scottish 
Secretary Ian Lang, in agreeing to the changes 
introduced in 1992, observed that "as part of the 
agreement to make the change it was recognised 
that spending needs in Scotland were higher and 
that convergence would not fall below that 
relatively higher spending need." (17) That view 
has been reaffirmed by the Labour Government, 
which sees the system as providing fair settlements 
for Scotland. 
The administrative changes introduced in 1992 
were important ones. Firstly the Scottish share of 
increases had remained based on its population 
relativity as it applied in 1976, and despite the 
continuing decline in Scotland's share of the UK 
population, Scotland continued to receive 10/85ths 
of any increase/decrease. This was adjusted in 
1992 to reflect the 1991 census, and is now 
recalculated annually. In 1976 Scotland had 
11.76% of the English, Scottish and Welsh 
populations (separate arrangements applied to 
Northern Ireland). In 1992, it had fallen to 10.66% 
and is currently at 10.32%. It will continue to fall. 
Changes were also made to the mechanisms of 
public expenditure planning that relate to the 
calculation of the baseline. Since 1992 the practices 
of uprating the previous budget by a uniform 
percentage rate, and of fully reflecting major public 
sector pay awards, have ceased. These obviously 
were advantageous to Scotland. With its higher 
levels of public expenditure being reflected in the 
new baseline. As the Treasury observed to the 
Treasury Committee" since 1992 provision for 
public sector pay awards has been built into the 
spending plans arrived at by applying the Barnett 
formula, with the blocks absorbing any shortfalls". 
(19). This would certainly impose stronger 
financial discipline on all programmes, (which was 
the intention) with additional implications for 
Scotland given the spending differentials. 
However, conventions remain for both uniform 
general adjustments outwith the formula, and for 
Scotland to seek 'add ons', by bidding for 
additional resources for programmes within the 
block in exceptional circumstances (20). 
Volume 25, No. 4,2000 40 
Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Economists interpretation of these changes are 
uniform. McGregor, Stevens, Swales and Yin 
argue that these "should promote faster 
convergence" (21); Cuthbert argues that "the 
Barnett formula now has teeth in a way that it did 
not have originally" (22); 
Kay argues that this will result in "a major change 
in Scotland's relative share of public spending over 
a very short period" (23) and McCrone sees" the 
straight application of the Barnett Formula bringing 
gradual but painful convergence" (24). 
The main policy response suggested is for a new 
needs assessment study. The Scottish Council 
Foundation did so as a means of protecting the 
devolution settlement, for otherwise:-
"Revising a formula may well fall in the future to a 
government at Westminster which is hostile to 
devolution and resentful of Scotland's share of 
public expenditure. Such a government may be 
tempted to cut the Scottish grant below the level of 
need perhaps to per capita levels" (25). 
Similar views were expressed by Heald and 
Geaughan, who see a new needs assessment study 
as "both inevitable and proper" (26) and by 
McCrone, as the only means of providing "a 
rational basis" for spending differentials (27). 
Moreover, there is a further argument that such a 
review would lead to a reduction in Scottish 
spending. Heald and Geughan question "whether 
the 16% differential revealed in 1996-97 (in a 
Treasury study) will hold up in full" (28); Cuthbert 
argues that "the view that all of Scotland's current 
level of spending can be justified on grounds of 
relative need is also likely to be unsustainable" 
(29); whilst McCrone believes it would have 
unpalatable results which require a strategy "for 
bringing expenditure into line with justified need at 
a pace than can be tolerated (30). In the context 
of devolution, McCormick and Alexander (the 
latter now a Labour Minister in the Executive) 
argued that a new needs assessment is "inevitable" 
in the long run. 
"In the early years, the Block allocation can be 
expected to grow in line with Labour's national 
commitment to fairer taxation and the closure of 
tax loopholes. However, the opportunities for 
spending in Scotland will eventually be influenced 
by the outcomes of adjusting Scottish expenditures 
in line with a new needs assessment" (31). 
This disappointing feature of these two orthodoxies 
on convergence and needs assessment is the extent 
to which such judgements have been reached on the 
basis of limited evidence. Research to assess 
convergence trends has only revealed the degree of 
convergence anticipated by the critics (32). 
Likewise the argument that Scotland is "over-
funded" is offered in the absence of evidence, apart 
from the "heavily qualified" Treasury study of 
1979 (33). 
The political response from regions which see 
themselves as disadvantaged has been to support 
demands to replace the existing demographic 
approach with a needs-based formula. Again, 
there have been few expositions as to how this 
would be carried out in practice. The problems of 
needs assessment reported in Heald's (1979) major 
study of devolution finance remain, and we shall 
consider these later. The nationalist response has 
been to argue that Scotland is in fiscal surplus, and 
the answer lies in "full fiscal autonomy" whereby 
the Scottish Parliament would raise all its taxes and 
make a contribution to UK services (34). The 
SNP's fiscal arithmetic has been challenged by 
most academic analysts (35), and remains a 
dubious proposition under devolution. 
Pressure for change within the UK remains, 
however. The Treasury Committee reported in 
favour of review in 1997, shortly after the 
devolution referendum in favour of the 
Government's proposals, and argued for the 
Government to bring the needs assessment up to 
date (36). London mayoral candidates argued for 
such a review in the 2000 election, and the Liberal 
leader, Charles Kennedy has recently supported the 
case for a needs based assessment throughout the 
UK. The Treasury Committee is to reconsider the 
matter in 2000-2001, with one protagonist arguing 
that the speed of convergence is inadequate (37). 
It is important therefore that some consideration of 
the existing evidence is undertaken. In the 
remainder of this paper, I offer a start to this 
process, presenting and assessing evidence on 
expenditure, and on needs indicators, in the public 
domain. 
SPENDING SINCE THE 1992 CHANGES 
I turn now to the expenditure outcomes. There are 
measurement problems in such analysis, as the data 
on the outcomes of the Barnett Formula is not in 
the public domain. We can assess the broad orders 
of magnitude of such changes in total identifiable 
expenditure, but it includes minor elements of 
spending undertaken by UK departments in 
Scotland (less than 4% of the total) as well as social 
security (which can be excluded) and spending 
from locally financed taxation (the uniform 
business rate and council tax). As the arguments 
relate to the impact of the Barnett Formula on total 
expenditure per capita however, this is acceptable. 
My argument is that the range of decisions taken 
outwith the formulaic element, together with 
Scotland's relative population decline limit the 
degree of convergence, and therefore we require to 
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see whether the formula impacts on spending as a 
whole, rather than simply the increases in the block 
element. To assess the convergence effect 
systematically requires analysis of all elements of 
public spending. 
The Labour Government has reformed the 
expenditure framework since coming to power. It 
now distinguishes analytically between 
departmental expenditure limits (to which the 
formula applies); annually managed expenditure 
(which are negotiated each year with the Treasury); 
and locally financed expenditure (in effect the 
projected income from property taxes). This data 
is available from 1993-4 in the government's 
planning documents. In the five-year period from 
1993-4, there were much greater increases in the 
non-formulaic elements, which worked to offset 
any convergence trend in the block (DEL). 
Convergence refers to per capita expenditure. To 
assess this effect we have used the Public 
Expenditure Statistical Analyses published annually 
by HM Treasury. This is the approach used by 
Gavin McCrone (38). Because this series ends in 
1997-98 we have utilised the period 1992-93 to 
1997-98. Identifiable expenditure remained 18% 
above the UK average over this period, and social 
security spending also remained stable at 8% 
above. We concentrate below on spending on 
public services, but unlike McCrone, we have 
retained spending on agriculture, fisheries, food 
and forestry in the calculation, as this constitutes 
devolved expenditure. The results are illustrated 
below (Tables 2, 3 and 4). Whereas identifiable 
expenditure on public services grew by 1.3% less 
than the UK average over the period in budget 
terms, it grew by 0.3% more in per capita terms 
(Table 2). In short, no convergence took place in a 
period of public expenditure growth, when 
according to the theory of the Barnett formula 
critics, it should have. What is even more striking 
about those outturn figures is the high degree of 
stability. The relative shares of identifiable 
expenditure remained the same throughout the five 
year period for all four nations of the UK, with 
England receiving 80%, Scotland 10%, Northern 
Ireland 6% and Wales 4%. Not surprisingly, there 
was also a high degree of stability in the spending 
differentials, using the UK as an index of 100 
(Table 3). 
In the Scottish case the outcomes reflect the growth 
in agriculture, fisheries and food programme from 
1996-7 (which is outwith Barnett) and the growth 
in the social security differential in 1997-8. This 
confirms our argument that non-formulaic spending 
programmes influence the convergence effect (as 
can population decline). This is illustrated in 
Table 4, which reveals a fairly consistent pattern 
cross the block programmes (i.e excluding social 
security and agriculture) with the exception of other 
environmental services which is complicated by the 
non-privatisation of water and sewerage in 
Scotland. These changes in programme 
differentials of course reflect changes in the 
spending programmes of all four nations of the UK 
What do these results mean for the predicted 
Barnett squeeze on convergence in future? The 
problem is that for the years since 1997-8 we can 
only utilise the Departmental Expenditure Limits, 
which account for only 86% of the Scottish budget 
Spending Review 2000 shows that Scotland's 
Departmental Expenditure limit will grow by 8% 
per annum, from £13120m in 1998-9 to £16230m 
in 2001-2. In terms of public spending, there is 
clearly no spending squeeze. Scottish critics argue 
that the Spending Review is unfair as it gives 
Scotland a lower percentage increase. In any 
resource allocation formula, population is the major 
driver of expenditure need (38), so with Scotland's 
relative share of the UK population in decline by 
0.4% per annum, a lower percentage increase is to 
be expected (Indeed, differential percentage 
increases are the norm for local authorities and 
health boards, and taken for granted). Over the 
three-year period, the Scottish share will fall from 
7.7% to 7.5%. This fall is modest and will be 
partially offset in per capita terms by population 
trends, and further influenced by the non-formulaic 
elements of the Scottish budget. In short, 
predictions of convergence because of the Bamett 
effect are dubious, because they cannot take 
account of the offsetting factors. 
Any change in the per capita spending differential 
relative to the UK is likely to be modest, and will 
not cause problems of financial management, in the 
context of real spending growth of around 5% per 
annum. Any Barnett effect will be more of a 
"tickle" than a "squeeze". The modest degree of 
convergence is, however, criticised from elsewhere 
in the UK as Scotland is perceived to be 
overfunded. Indeed, Lord Barnett himself recently 
told the Treasury Committee that "Scotland gets far 
more than it should" because the formula is not 
needs based. This requires investigation. 
In the period 1992-97, the recalibration of the 
population formula should have provided more 
significant evidence of a trend to convergence. 
However, in 1993 and 94, the administrative 
responsibilities of the Scottish Office grew as a 
result of the Conservatives' 'Taking Stock" 
initiative, and several programmes were added to 
the Scottish Block, increasing the total by £947 
millions. Scotland also retained water and 
sewerage as a public service. For the first three 
years, Scottish spending grew relative to the UK 
reaching a high point of 126 in 1995-6, then falling 
back over the next two years to 120. Table 6 
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confines itself to identifiable expenditure on 
services within the block. The spending data 
includes a small amount of spending by UK 
departments (less than 4%) so this should not affect 
the trend. Over the five year period, Scottish 
spending within the block fell by 2% relative to the 
UK as a" whole. As we saw earlier, however, 
significant increase in the non-block elements of 
the Scottish budget worked to offset the 
convergence Bamett, leaving the Scottish position 
unchanged overall. Under New Labour's spending 
plans, significant real term's growth will be the 
pattern from 1998-99, after three years of real 
reductions since 1994-5. That should result in a 
stronger convergence trend within the block, but 
whether or not this will result in convergence in the 
total budget will depend on the outcomes of non-
formulaic decisions. 
When the degree of convergence was discussed at 
the Treasury Committee in July, Jim Cousin's MP 
argued that Barnett does not deliver convergence at 
all. The reality is, that in certain conditions, the 
application of the formula will result in 
convergence, but in other conditions it may not. 
Some MPs (and Lord Barnett) appear to believe 
that a change to a needs-based formula would 
inevitably result in Scotland receiving less. Such 
critics have pointed to Scotland's progress in terms 
of GDP per capita and average income levels since 
1979. These are misleading indicators of spending 
needs. Of course, Scotland's score on both these 
indicators has been influenced by oil, but these are 
not measures which would be used in any of the 
public service programmes to which Barnett 
applies. We can explore this further. 
In the most recent year for which data is available, 
Scotland received public expenditure per capita of 
£4722, compared with a UK average of £4051, an 
excess of £721. However, we would require to 
discount the sums arising from agriculture, 
fisheries, food and forestry (much of which is 
driven by EC decisions) and social security (which 
is demand led) as neither of these programmes are 
within the Block. Together those count for £218 
of the Scottish excess. This reduces the amount 
accrued by Barnett to £503 per capita. If the 
Scottish Block was funded at the same level as the 
rest of the UK, it would lose £2.6 billions to the 
rest of the UK. However, this is clearly 
implausible, given Scotland's higher needs. 
The existence of factors contributing to higher 
expenditure needs was acknowledged in Treasury's 
evidence to the Treasury Committee's review of the 
Barnett Formula. These included greater levels of 
sparsity, poverty and poor health. The undertaking 
of a new needs assessment study is a major task, 
which must be completed by Government as the 
only institution having the capacity to generate the 
necessary data. My own position has been to 
argue that a new needs assessment would face 
considerable technical difficulties, in that the more 
sophisticated statistical models of need which are 
now in use for distributing resources to health 
authorities and local government could not be 
utilised in this case. There are too few data points 
for statistical reliability, the methods are replete 
with problems of interpretation, and the dependent 
variables used (expenditure and usage) are 
inappropriate in the absence of a common statutory 
and funding framework, and the means to 
adequately control the effect of political decisions 
on resource allocation (39). 
Empirical methods have the advantage of deriving 
weightings for some factors mathematically on the 
basis of regression techniques. Normative 
methods, which are also in use, determine such 
weightings on the basis of judgement. Whilst 
evidence may underpin those judgements, - and 
both empirical and normative approaches require 
interpretation and judgement, - the scope for 
argument remains substantial. A new needs 
assessment will not provide definitive objective 
answers to questions of resource distribution. The 
word 'assessment' is more appropriate than 
'measurement'. This problem was noted in the 
1975 White Paper on Scottish devolution, and its 
observations remain sound today. 
"No neat formula could be devised to produce fair 
shares for Scotland in varying circumstances from 
year to year. The task involves judgements of 
great complexity and political sensitivity. 
Nevertheless, objective information on standards 
and needs would help the Scottish administration, 
the Government and Parliament to make their 
judgements." (40) 
Assessment of need is part of the language of 
resource allocation. It need not imply a formulaic 
approach, although it is often interpreted in this 
way. The Treasury needs assessment study of 
1979 provided a benchmark to assist those 
judgements, but it did not provide the basis for 
resource allocation, which requires consideration of 
existing commitments and the scope for change. 
As noted earlier, the decision to entrench the 
existing spending differentials in the Bamett 
Formula in 1978 was recognition that in broad 
terms, the differences in expenditure were 
reflective of need, and that the needs assessment 
study was not 'exhaustive'. That study concluded 
that Scottish expenditure was some 6% greater than 
its needs, and 22% greater than England (See Table 
5), a relative position which, as we have shown, 
pertains today. (41) 
The Treasury approach was to identify a range of 
primary factors, mainly client groups such as total 
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population, numbers of school children or 
unemployed, or infrastructure provision such as 
road mileage and public housing, which were the 
major determinant of expenditure need in particular 
programmes, and a range of secondary factors, such 
as demographic structure (age and sex), poverty, 
sparsity and climactic conditions which placed 
additional needs/costs on public authorities. We 
would need access to a comparable body of 
research information to begin to make assessments 
about the relative weights to be applied to such 
factors today. 
However, my purpose is more limited. It is simply 
to demonstrate that, on the basis of the key 
indicators available in the public domain, it is clear 
that Scotland (and Wales and Northern Ireland) 
continues to have expenditure needs above the UK 
average, and that it is premature to assume that any 
needs assessment study would inevitably result in 
reduced allocations to Scotland. 
According to the recent Cabinet Office report, 
Scotland has levels of GDP which are 92-96% of 
the UK average; unemployment 11% above the UK 
average; housing benefit levels 30% above the UK 
level and poor health which is 15% above the UK 
level. (42) From other sources, we know that 
social security expenditure is 8% above the UK 
level (43); public housing is 70% above the UK 
level; road mileage is 54% above the UK norm; 
and Scotland has a level of sparsity which is four 
times the UK average. That is reflected in smaller 
schools (the Treasury study assessed the cost of 
educating rural pupils as 8% above the average); 
smaller list sizes for GPs and special allowances to 
compensate; longer stays in hospital for rural 
patients; and Scotland's share of the rural 
population is about 30% compared with 8.7% of 
the total UK population. 
If we examine the degree of excess in the service 
programmes within the block, then the questionable 
nature of the overfunding assumption becomes 
clearer. The biggest percentage excess (see Table 
7) is in trade, industry, energy and employment, 
which was determined on a UK basis until 1993. 
The higher spending on roads and housing does not 
appear extreme given the higher incidence of road 
mileage and public housing, indeed, needs may be 
greater, and law and order and other environmental 
services are insignificant. The two significant 
differences in cash terms are education and health. 
Of these, the education spending differential raises 
the most doubts, although consideration needs to be 
given to the high level of incoming students to the 
universities, as Scotland has nearly 12% of students 
with around 9% of the population. The high levels 
of poor health and additional sparsity costs, and the 
need to discount some element of teaching hospital 
costs (which involve UK-wide benefits) suggest the 
health differential may be defensible. (44) 
A review of the Barnett formula arrangements at 
this stage is not yet on the Government's agenda, 
and the case for such a review is not yet 
convincing. To claim for the North East, for 
example, on the basis of a comparison of GDP 
figures only, that "on any fresh needs assessment 
public spending per head would be above 
Scotland's" (45) is a gross distortion, and a 
judgement wholly lacking in balance. In any case, 
a review within the present structure of government 
can only consider the method of allocating funds to 
the devolved administrations, not the English 
regions, whose resources are determined by a 
number of departments and allocated directly to 
spending agencies. If there are problems of 
resource allocation within England, these are a 
matter for the relevant Ministers, and will not be 
tackled by revising the funding arrangements for 
devolution. Advocates of reform need to provide 
more convincing research evidence than simple 
GDP per head comparisons. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The rationale for extending the financial 
arrangements for administrative devolution to the 
new political institutions is clear. This would 
provide the continuity and stability necessary for 
the transition to devolved government. The 
pattern of spending inherited by the Scottish 
Parliament both reflects higher needs, provides the 
resources to meet inherited commitments, and, 
through allocations at the margins, reflects 
Scotland's declining population share by funding 
slower growth than for the UK as a whole. 
This preliminary assessment suggests it would be 
premature to review these arrangements at this 
time. On the key indicators, Scotland continues to 
require expenditure levels above the UK average, 
although the extent of that higher need cannot be 
determined with precision. Secondly, it is also 
premature to assume that any such review must 
result in a redistribution of resources away from 
Scotland. 
Thirdly, it is clear that the present arrangements 
continue to provide higher per capita spending for 
all three nations with devolved government, and 
that the evidence of convergence is modest. Since 
the recalibration of the population relativities in 
1992, there have been divergent and convergent 
trends. In the context of the existing planned 
growth in expenditure, we would expect some 
further convergence, but because of the offsetting 
factors, would expect it to remain modest. 
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Finally, the benefits of the arrangements in terms of 
financial management should be acknowledged. In 
government budgets, inherited commitments 
confine the scope for change to choices at the 
margins. The devolution arrangements have 
institutionalised incremental change, bringing 
stability to allocations, and avoiding the 
requirement to apply safety nets to limit financial 
change through the greater turbulence which arises 
in needs-based systems such as the Scottish Health 
Authorities Resource Equalisation model (SHARE) 
or the Revenue Support Grant (RSG) for local 
authorities. These are valuable properties of the 
present system which should not be discarded 
lightly, given the limits to needs assessment. As 
the Scottish Finance Minister wrote recently "it 
would be all too easy to conclude from this that 
measuring relative need is too difficult and should 
never be done. I do not subscribe to that, however. 
What I do say is that nobody should underestimate 
the difficult and complexity of such an exercise. A 
more limited study which took place in the 1970s 
took over two years to complete and was unable to 
present definitive figures for relative need, but 
rather presented ranges within which these needs 
might fall. 
It is important to realise also that any such study is 
never going to produce anything resembling a 
definitive answer. The best outcome is only ever 
going to be information; information which can 
then provide a basis for subsequent debate and 
ultimately political decision. (46) 
I agree with this view. The Government rightly 
moved away from the instability of a model based 
on assigned revenues to the present assigned 
budget based on the baseline expenditures, 
formulaic adjustments, and negotiated annual 
decisions. Finally, it must be recognised by 
advocates of change that this issue is no longer a 
matter within the preserve of the UK Government. 
The 1997 White Paper recognised this by 
acknowledging that "any more substantial revisions 
would need to be preceded by an in-depth study of 
relative spending requirements and would be 
subject to full consultation between the Scottish 
Executive and the UK Govemment.(47) 
In any such exercise, a robust and persuasive case 
that Scotland continues to have higher expenditure 
needs can be made. Since 1979, there has been 
much faster growth of private consumption of 
health, education and housing in England in 
contrast with Scotland. The differences of 
sparsity, poverty, unemployment, poor health and 
climate which influence spending in Scotland 
remain significant. A convincing case for a review 
of Barnett has not yet been made. 
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TABLE 4 SCOTTISH IDENTDJTABLE EXPENDITURE DIFFERENTIALS SINCE 1992-3 (UK = 100) 
Agriculture, fisheries, food and forestry 




Other environmental services 
Law, order and protective services 
Education 
Culture, media and sport 











































































Source: Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (HM Treasury) 
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TABLE 5 NEEDS ASSESSMENT BY PROGRAMME 1976-7 (ENGLAND = 100) 
Health and Social Services 
Education and Libraries 
Housing 
Other Environmental Services 
Roads and Transport 


















Source: HM Treasury 1979 































TABLE 7 PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE RELATIVE TO UK AVERAGE 1997-8 
Trade, Industry Energy and Employment 
Roads and Transport 
Housing 
Other Environmental Services 
Law, Order and Protection Services 
Education 
Culture, Media and Sport 
Health and Personal Social Services 
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